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Abstract
In the last two decades, trade liberalization under GATT/WTO has been partly
offset by an increase in antidumping protection due to the inclusion of sales below
cost in the definition of dumping. The cost-based definition gives regulating authorities an opportunity to choose protection according to their liking. This paper
investigates the domestic government’s antidumping duty choice in an asymmetric
information framework where the foreign firm’s cost is observed by the domestic
firm, but not by the government. To induce truthful revelation, the government
can design a tariff schedule, contingent on firms’ cost reports, accompanied by a
threat to collect additional information for report verification (i.e., auditing) and,
in case misreporting is detected, to set penalty duties. We devise a mechanism
where the domestic and foreign firm may be asked to provide cost reports under
which the full-information, i.e., efficient, tariffs are implementable. We also discuss the conditions under which this policy is optimal and when it may be better to
instead adopt a ”facts available” policy, i.e., a policy where no information from
the foreign firm is solicited.
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by a threat to collect additional information for report verification (i.e., auditing)
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1. Introduction
Trade liberalization under GATT/WTO has been an impressive success. Not
only have average tariff levels been lowered considerably, but additional product categories not included in previous trade liberalization agreements have also recently
become subject to the general liberalization process, e.g. agricultural products and
textiles. Yet, right from the beginning, trade liberalization under GATT was not
without exceptions. In fact, one major reason why the number of countries signing
off on the GATT increased so considerably was probably that the agreement contained numerous provisions to allow participants to “withdraw – or cease to apply –
their normal obligations in order to protect (safeguard) certain overriding interests.”
(Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001, p.303). One such exception provision that has proved
especially popular are antidumping measures. Article VI of GATT stipulates that
member countries can impose antidumping duties on products that are imported at
below-normal value and cause material injury to a domestic industry. During the
first decades of the GATT, antidumping duties were used rather infrequently. This
changed with the completion of the GATT Tokyo Round in 1979, when the antidumping statute was amended. First, the definition of selling below fair or normal value
was extended to include sales below cost; i.e., these days the “fair/normal value”
is more likely to be a value constructed from cost estimates and “reasonable” additions rather than being an observable market price. Moreover, it was no longer
deemed necessary to prove that dumping was the principal cause of material injury
(Blonigen and Prusa, 2003). These changes eventually resulted in a veritable antidumping “boom”. Whereas the successful completion of the Uruguay Round led to
considerable progress in bringing down average tariff rates and increasing the product
range to which trade liberalization applied, a parallel movement to increase trade protection under the cloak of “fair trade” took place: From 1995 to 1999, the number of
antidumping actions increased more than six-fold, and the number of users increased
dramatically as well, with developing countries starting to add antidumping to their
trade policy toolkit (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001, p.316).
It has been well recognized by trade economists that “dumping”, in particular
when employing the cost-based definition, is a flexible term and can be used rather
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arbitrarily to impede foreign competition in the domestic market, thus creating a new
protectionism under the auspices of GATT/WTO (Blonigen and Prusa, 2003). In
this paper, we investigate how optimal antidumping duties (in the sense of domestic
welfare-maximizing) are calculated, given that the domestic government, i.e., the
antidumping authority, does not have a priori knowledge of the true costs of foreign
firms. Since the government does not have the cost information, but the foreign firms
and maybe even the domestic firms do, it makes sense to consider the question of
optimal antidumping duties in an asymmetric information framework. In particular,
we show how the domestic antidumping authority can use optimal mechanism design
to obtain the foreign cost information. We also discuss the conditions under which
it is optimal to gather information from both domestic and foreign firms and when
it may be better to instead adopt a “facts available” policy, i.e., a policy where no
information from foreign firms is solicited.
The market structure in this paper is a Cournot duopoly with one domestic firm
and one foreign firm, where the foreign firm’s cost is unknown to the antidumping
authority, similarly to the setup in Cheng, Qiu, and Wong (2001). However, our
paper is different from theirs in that, in line with reality, we do not allow lump sum
payments from the government to the firms as an instrument to extract the true cost
information. Moreover, we do not require that the antidumping duty be conditional
on any real existing dumping margin. In principle, dumping implies that a firm either
sells a good below the price in another market or below cost plus some “reasonable”
profit, administrative and sales cost additions. However, it has been well documented
that in antidumping investigations, dumping margin calculations, especially in the
increasingly popular case when dumping is determined based on cost information,
are routinely set up in such a way that the authorities find evidence of dumping,
regardless of the underlying facts. For this reason, the question then becomes what
antidumping duty the authority wants to levy. The focus on the determination of an
optimal antidumping duty regardless of whether dumping has actually occurred can
also be found in Kolev and Prusa (2002). They consider a signaling framework where
the foreign firm may send a high-cost signal by restraining its exports voluntarily.
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In this paper, we investigate a different aspect of antidumping investigations;
namely, that the domestic authority may ask foreign firms, who have been accused of
dumping, to disclose their cost information. Any information received from foreign
firms is then considered together with the domestic petitioners’ claims about foreign
cost and may be further supplemented by the domestic authority’s own findings. We
model this information acquisition process by assuming that the domestic authority
first decides whether to ask the foreign firm to state its cost or whether to rely
only on the information from the domestic firm, and then determines whether or
not to gather additional information in order to verify possibly conflicting claims. To
implement the optimal mechanism, the authority chooses report-specific antidumping
duties, auditing probabilities, and punitive duties in case a firm has been caught lying.
Kohler and Moore (2001) also model auditing during an antidumping investigation,
but they assume perfect competition, and the asymmetric information in their paper
is about domestic cost and whether or not material injury has occurred.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the
basic model. Section 3 discusses the case when the government only solicits cost
information from the domestic firm, whereas Section 4 is about the case when both
the domestic and the foreign firm provide cost reports. Both Sections 3 and 4 assume
that auditing is perfect and thus always detects untruthful cost reports, whereas in
Section 5, auditing is assumed to be imperfect. In Section 6, we discuss what happens
when the government cannot commit to auditing ex-post. Section 7 concludes.

2. The Model
Consider a country with a linear inverse market demand function p = a − bQ,
where p is price, Q is quantity, and a, b > 0. Let the market be served by two firms,
one domestic (firm 1) and one foreign (firm 2), that compete in Cournot fashion
in a one-shot game. Denote their output levels by q1 and q2 where q1 + q2 = Q.
The domestic firm has constant marginal cost c1 and the foreign firm has constant
marginal cost c2 . Fixed costs are assumed to be zero for both firms.
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If the government sets a specific import tariff (antidumping duty) t, the firms
produce
q1 (t) =

a + c2 + t − 2c1
,
3b

q2 (t) =

a + c1 − 2(c2 + t)
3b

if t ≤ t0 ,

where t0 is the tariff at which the foreign firm shuts down production, i.e., t0 =
(a + c1 − 2c2 )/2. For our model to make sense, firm 2 must produce in the absence
of any governmental intervention, i.e. q2 (0) > 0. For simplicity, we also assume that
q1 (0) > 0.
The home firm initiates an antidumping investigation by filing a dumping
complaint and providing information about the alleged dumping. Here, we assume
that the domestic firm provides information about the foreign firm’s cost parameter c2 .
Based on its beliefs about foreign cost, the home government (antidumping authority)
wants to choose the antidumping duty t that maximizes domestic welfare. Since
t > t0 leads to the same allocation as t = t0 , the government can restrict its choice
to t ∈ [0, t0 ]. Hence, the domestic welfare is given by
W (c2 , t) = V (c2 , t) + Π1 (c2 , t) + T (c2 , t)

(2.1)

where V = (2a − c1 − c2 − t)2 /(18b) denotes consumer surplus, Π1 = (a + c2 + t −
2c1 )2 /(9b) the domestic profit, and T = t(a + c1 − 2c2 − 2t)/(3b) the tariff revenue.
The efficient tariff that maximizes (2.1) is given by
t∗ =

a − c2
3

(2.2)

and is decreasing in the foreign firm’s marginal cost. Notice that in order to set the
efficient tariff, knowledge about the domestic cost parameter is not needed. However,
the domestic government does need to know the foreign firm’s marginal cost c2 .1
The cost parameter c2 is observed by both firms, but not by the government.
A priori, the latter only knows that c2 = cH with probability α and c2 = cL with
probability 1−α, where α ∈ (0, 1) and cL < cH . We denote the corresponding efficient
(welfare-maximizing full information) tariffs by t∗H and t∗L , respectively.
1To avoid tedious

of c2 .

discussions of corner solutions, we assume that t∗ > 0 for all possible realizations
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The government can try and induce firms to truthfully reveal their cost information. To do so, it ex-ante announces a differentiated tariff schedule and auditing
probabilities that are both contingent on firms’ cost reports. By conducting an audit, the government is able to verify firms’ reports, thereby incurring cost A ≥ 0.
This audit can be thought of as gathering additional information about foreign cost
from independent sources. For simplicity, we assume for now that the audit will always uncover the true cost parameter. The case of imperfect auditing is discussed in
Section 5.
Throughout the paper, we assume that tariffs are contractible so that the
government can ex-ante commit to a tariff schedule, even if it might ex-post lead to
suboptimal measures.2 Initially, we also assume that auditing probabilities can be
contracted upon. However, since compliance with an auditing scheme is particularly
difficult to verify, we analyze the implications of non-contractible auditing in Section
6. Furthermore, lump sum payments to or from firms are not feasible in our model.3
3. Using only information provided by the domestic firm
We first look at the case where the government relies only on the information
about foreign cost provided by the home firm in its dumping complaint. The foreign
firm is not asked to make a statement about its cost.4 Depending on the home firm’s
2For

example, the foreign firm can be prevented from overstating c2 if the government ex-ante

credibly commits to implementing an inefficiently high tariff in case it detects cost exaggeration.
The problem is that such a tariff scheme is not self-enforcing since ex-post the government prefers to
impose the tariff t∗L . However, if the tariff scheme can be contracted upon, inefficiently high tariffs will
be demanded (i.e., enforced) by the domestic firm that benefits from a higher tariff. Alternatively,
the tariff scheme will be self-enforcing if the government sufficiently cares about its reputation in
future anti-dumping cases. The analysis of such a reputational equilibrium in a repeated game is
beyond the scope of this paper and is left for future research.
3
Payments from firms to the antidumping authority would be viewed as attempted bribery and are
thus not allowed. Payments from the authority to firms are considered as trade-distorting subsidies
forbidden under the WTO. For example, the Byrd amendment, that distributed antidumping revenue
to petitioning firms in the U.S., was ruled in violation with WTO rules in 2003 and had to be
scrapped.
4
Prior to 1994, it was rather common that under a procedure called “facts available”, only information from domestic petitioners was taken into account and information provided by foreign firms

7

report i ∈ {L, H}, the government audits with probability θi ∈ [0, 1]. If no audit takes
place or if the audit confirms the firm’s report, the government implements the tariff
ti . However, if the government conducts an audit and detects a misrepresentation of
the foreign firm’s cost, the tariff fi – intended to punish an untruthful report – will
be imposed.
The government’s problem of maximizing expected domestic welfare subject
to truthful cost revelation by the domestic firm thus looks as follows:
max

tL ,tH ,fL ,fH ,θL ,θH

{α[W (cH , tH ) − θH A] + (1 − α)[W (cL , tL ) − θL A]}

subject to the constraints
Π1 (cH , tH ) ≥ (1 − θL )Π1 (cH , tL ) + θL Π1 (cH , fH ),

(3.1a)

Π1 (cL , tL ) ≥ (1 − θH )Π1 (cL , tH ) + θH Π1 (cL , fL ).

(3.1b)

Inequalities (3.1a) and (3.1b) are the domestic firm’s incentive compatibility constraints when the foreign firm’s cost parameter is cH and cL , respectively. We do not
consider any participation constraints for the domestic firm since it already provides
information about c2 in the antidumping petition.5
To find the solution to this optimization problem, we first relax it by dropping constraint (3.1b); this seems reasonable because if c2 = cL , then the domestic
firm would have no incentive to lie about cost, provided that tL ≥ tH , which will
presumably hold given that t∗L > t∗H . We next show that the solution of this relaxed
problem also satisfies the constraint previously dropped and hence also solves the
original problem.
At the optimal solution of the relaxed problem, θH = 0 whereas fL can be
chosen arbitrarily. Considering the incentive compatibility constraint for the high cost
case, the harshest punishment that the government can inflict on a lying domestic
firm is to set fH = 0; i.e., the government rejects the domestic firm’s dumping claim
was disregarded. During the Uruguay Round, trading partners agreed on limiting the lopsidedness
of this procedure, but in practice, it seems that administrators have not fundamentally improved
upon the application of “facts available”, see Moore (2006) for a thorough discussion.
5Even without this assumption, the participation constraints could always be easily satisfied by
choosing appropriately low punishment tariffs in case the domestic firm provides no cost information.
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and does not impose any antidumping duty. The relaxed maximization problem can
therefore be rewritten as
max {αW (cH , tH ) + (1 − α)[W (cL , tL ) − θL A]}

tL ,tH ,θL

subject to
Π1 (cH , tH ) ≥ (1 − θL )Π1 (cH , tL ) + θL Π1 (cH , 0).

(3.2)

After solving this problem and verifying that the solution also satisfies (3.1b), we
obtain the following result; see Appendix A for details.
Proposition 3.1. For the case where only the domestic firm provides cost information, it is optimal for the government to audit with a strictly positive probability only
if a low-cost report arrives. The optimal tariff tL for the low-cost firm is above the
optimal tariff tH for the high-cost firm; but tH is above the efficient tariff t∗H , and
tL is below the efficient tariff t∗L except for the case that auditing is costless. In case
the domestic firm is caught lying, a penalty tariff fH ≤ tH will be imposed, but in
equilibrium, lying never occurs.
The larger the gap between the low- and the high-cost tariff, tL −tH , the higher
is the domestic firm’s incentive to deliver an untruthful report if c2 = cH . To sustain
truthful revelation, the government can therefore increase tL − tH only by raising the
auditing probability. Trading off the implementation of more favorable tariffs versus
expected auditing cost, the government optimally chooses a tariff gap that is smaller
than t∗L − t∗H . Implicit differentiation of the first-order conditions (A.3) and (A.4) in
Appendix A yields that tL − tH decreases in A and increases in α. Intuitively, the
higher the auditing cost A, the more expensive it is to implement a large tariff gap.
By contrast, the higher the probability that the foreign firm is a high-cost type, the
less likely it is that a low-cost report arrives. Consequently, auditing costs have to be
incurred less often, thereby making a larger tariff gap optimal.
4. Soliciting additional information from the foreign firm
4.1. The foreign firm is always asked to report. Instead of using only the domestic firm’s report as primary source for information on c2 , the government can also
ask the foreign firm for its cost information. Soliciting cost information from the
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foreign firm leads to an additional fixed cost K, which is distinct from the auditing
cost A and consists of preparing a questionnaire, sending it to the foreign firm, and
processing the information. In contrast, obtaining information from the domestic firm
is costless or at least less costly6, given that it already provides the cost information
in its antidumping petition.
In this section, we examine the case where the government always asks the
foreign firm for cost information after a dumping complaint has been filed. Let
θij be the audit probability if firm 1 reports cost as i and firm 2 reports j, where
i, j ∈ {L, H}. When the reports coincide, i.e., i = j, a tariff tii is imposed if no
audit takes place or if an audit takes place and the reports are found to be correct.
However, if the audit detects lying, tariffs are hii if c2 = cH and lii if c2 = cL . When
firms’ reports differ and no audit takes place, tariff tij is implemented. In case the
government audits, it imposes a tariff hij if it turns out that c2 = cH , and lij if the
audit reveals that c2 = cL . Finally, let f be the tariff that the domestic government
chooses if the foreign firm refuses to participate, i.e., does not provide the requested
cost information.
We assume that the government wishes to implement truthful reporting of
both firms as a unique Nash equilibrium. To solve the government’s problem, we
proceed in two steps. First, we determine a welfare-maximizing combination of tariffs
and audits under which truth-telling is a Nash equilibrium. Next, we show that given
these tariffs and auditing probabilities, this equilibrium is also unique.
To ensure that providing correct cost information constitutes a Nash equilibrium, the government chooses {tij , tii , hij , lij , f, θij , θii } to maximize

α[W (cH , tHH ) − θHH A] + (1 − α)[W (cL , tLL ) − θLL A] − K,

6The

information provided by the domestic firm needs to be processed as well, but the antidump-

ing authority has no choice but to incur this cost, and this cost is presumably lower than the cost
of gathering and processing information from abroad. The parameter K is thus best understood as
the difference between obtaining cost information from both firms versus obtaining such information
from only the domestic firm.
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subject to the constraints that
Π1 (cH , tHH ) ≥ (1 − θLH )Π1 (cH , tLH ) + θLH Π1 (cH , hLH ),

(4.1a)

Π1 (cL , tLL ) ≥ (1 − θHL )Π1 (cL , tHL ) + θHL Π1 (cL , lHL ),

(4.1b)

Π2 (cH , tHH ) ≥ (1 − θHL )Π2 (cH , tHL ) + θHL Π2 (cH , hHL ),

(4.1c)

Π2 (cL , tLL ) ≥ (1 − θLH )Π2 (cL , tLH ) + θLH Π2 (cL , lLH ),

(4.1d)

Π2 (cH , tHH ) ≥ Π2 (cH , f ),

(4.1e)

Π2 (cL , tLL ) ≥ Π2 (cL , f ).

(4.1f)

The first two constraints are the incentive compatibility constraints for firm 1, the
next two are the incentive compatibility constraints for firm 2, and the last two are
the participation constraints for the high- and the low-cost type of firm 2.
First note that (4.1b) and (4.1c) are easily satisfied by announcing θHL = 0
and a tariff tHL such that tHH ≤ tHL ≤ tLL .7 Intuitively, to achieve a high tariff,
the domestic firm will not misrepresent a low cost parameter. Similarly, to promote
the implementation of a low tariff, the foreign firm will not lie about high cost.
Moreover, there are several ways to ensure that the efficient tariffs t∗H and t∗L are
incentive-compatible. Because of its intuitive appeal and to guarantee uniqueness of
the equilibrium, we pick the following incentive scheme: The government announces
to always audit if the foreign firm claims to have high cost while the domestic firm
insists on a low cost parameter. It then implements an inefficiently low tariff to punish
the domestic firm if it turns out that c2 = cH and an inefficiently high tariff otherwise.
Formally, the ex-ante announced scheme comprises θLH = 1, tHH = t∗H > hLH and
tLL = t∗L < lLH . Finally, firm 2’s participation constraints are satisfied if f ≥ t∗L . It is
unnecessary to audit when identical reports arrive, hence θHH = θLL = 0. Obviously,
this combination of tariffs and auditing probabilities maximizes the government’s
objective function.
It remains to verify that truth-telling is indeed the only Nash equilibrium
under the proposed incentive scheme. Consider the case c2 = cL . The reports i = L
and j = H cannot constitute a Nash equilibrium since the foreign firm can increase
7Under

the optimal tariff scheme, tHH ≤ tLL always holds.
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its profit by stating its true cost, thereby avoiding a punishing tariff. The reports
i = j = H are not a Nash equilibrium since the domestic firm has an incentive to
deviate. Finally, in case i = H and j = L, depending on the value of tHL , at least
one firm has an incentive to deviate. A similar argument applies if c2 = cH . Thus we
have the following result:
Proposition 4.1. If both firms are asked for a report, the efficient tariffs t∗H and
t∗L are implemented; moreover, auditing never takes place and hence does not cause
any costs. Therefore, from the government’s point of view, asking both firms for
information is preferable to only relying on the domestic firm’s report, provided that
the fixed cost K of soliciting information from the foreign firm is sufficiently low.
Compared to the case where the foreign firm is not asked to participate in the
antidumping investigation, the equilibrium duties are optimal from the government’s
perspective, and no auditing costs are incurred. The only drawback of soliciting
additional information from the foreign firm is the additional fixed cost K.
However, K may be such that it exceeds the expected sum of auditing costs
and welfare loss from not implementing the efficient tariffs when relying only on the
domestic firm’s report. In this case, the government should refrain from soliciting
information from the foreign firm and apply the procedure described in Section 3.
Asking only one firm is more likely to be optimal if α is large and/or A is small,
indicating that expected auditing costs are low and, therefore, the implemented tariffs
do not strongly differ from the efficient ones when only the domestic firm reports.
4.2. Conditional reporting of the foreign firm. In the previous section, it was
shown that when both firms are asked for a cost report, the government implements
the efficient tariff scheme and never audits. Thus, compared to the first-best world
where the government observes the foreign firm’s cost, welfare is diminished only by
the cost of soliciting and processing the additional information of the foreign firm,
K. By contrast, in Section 3, we have seen that asking only the domestic firm for
cost information results in a distortion of the tariff scheme and the occurrence of
auditing cost. However, the government does not have to incur K. In this section, we
answer the question whether a “hybrid” case may be superior. In such a hybrid case,
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depending on the initial information obtained from the domestic firm, the government
decides whether or not to also ask the foreign firm for information. This approach
has the obvious advantage that K does not always have to be paid.
In particular, since a high-cost report of the domestic firm seems to be trustworthy as long as the tariff is decreasing in c2 , we propose the following mechanism: If
the domestic firm’s dumping complaint contains the information that costs are high,
the government implements t∗H . If, however, the domestic firm reports low cost, the
government asks the foreign firm for complementary information. If the foreign firm
confirms that c2 = cL , the tariff t∗L is imposed; else, the government conducts an
audit, followed by the implementation of hLH < t∗H if it turns out that c2 = cH and
lLH > t∗L otherwise. Finally, participation of the foreign firm is ensured by choosing
a tariff f ≥ t∗L in case of non-participation.
Solving this game by backwards induction, it is easily verified that truth-telling
is the unique equilibrium. Consider the stage where the foreign firm is asked about
its cost, implying that the domestic firm delivered a low-cost report. If c2 = cL , the
foreign firm prefers to tell the truth to avoid a punishing tariff after an audit. If
c2 = cH , the foreign firm contradicts the claim of the domestic firm to obtain a lower
tariff. Given that the foreign firm will not misrepresent its cost, the domestic firm
cannot benefit from lying in the first stage, either. This leads to the next result:
Proposition 4.2. Consider the case when the antidumping authority only solicits
additional information from the foreign firm if the domestic firm reports c2 = cL ,
but believes the domestic firm’s report otherwise. Then, the full information tariffs
t∗H and t∗L are implemented; auditing never takes place and hence does not cause any
costs. Moreover, with probability α, i.e., the probability that c2 = cH , no costs of
asking the foreign firm have to be incurred. Hence, this mechanism is preferable to
the one where information is always solicited from both firms.
Since this two-step procedure reduces the expected cost of collecting information from the foreign firm and at the same time also leads to zero auditing costs and
implementation of the full information duties, it clearly dominates the mechanism
where the authority always asks both firms. It thus also increases the threshold for

13

the fixed costs K above which the authority would, regardless of the domestic firm’s
cost report, never ask the foreign firm for information.
5. Imperfect Auditing
Thus far, we have assumed that conducting an audit is perfect in the sense
that it always reveals the true cost. In this section, we extend our model to the
case when auditing is imperfect. Suppose that, if a firm has lied and the government
audits, it detects lying with probability τ , where 0 ≤ τ < 1 (τ = 1 corresponds to
perfect auditing). With probability 1−τ , the government does not uncover a wrongful
report. In Section 4, we have shown that the government prefers conditional reporting
to always soliciting a report from the foreign firm. Therefore, we henceforth compare
the conditional reporting procedure (scheme C) to the one where only the domestic
firm’s report is taken into account (scheme D).
We first need to specify scheme C more generally. If i = H, the tariff is tH ; if
i = L, the foreign firm is asked for a report. If j = L, the tariff is tLL ; if j = H, the
government conducts an audit with probability θLH . If there is no audit or the audit
does not reveal which firm lied, the tariff is tLH . If there is an audit and it turns out
that c2 = cH , the tariff is hLH ; if there is an audit revealing c2 = cL , the tariff lLH is
imposed.
For the next result, recall that t0 is the tariff at which the foreign firm shuts
down production. We derive the following result, which is proven in Appendix A:
Proposition 5.1. Suppose that auditing uncovers the foreign firm’s true cost with
probability τ ∈ [0, 1). Under scheme C, a necessary condition for tH and tLL to be
feasible is that
tLL − tH ≤ τ t0 .

(5.1)

Under scheme D, a necessary condition for tH and tL to be implementable is that
tL − tH ≤ τ t L .

(5.2)

Proposition 5.1 shows that diminishing the effectiveness of the auditing process
has a detrimental effect on both schemes. Under scheme C, although auditing never
occurs in equilibrium, its potential ineffectiveness nevertheless intensifies incentives to
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lie and thereby restricts the set of tariffs that can be implemented in a truth-telling
equilibrium. In particular, by (5.1), if auditing is sufficiently unproductive, i.e., if
τ t0 < t∗L − t∗H , the efficient tariffs are no longer implementable. Under scheme D, a
decrease in τ means that, in case of an audit, a wrongful report is less likely to be
detected. To sustain incentives for truth-telling, the government optimally decreases
the tariff gap and raises the auditing probability.
Given that tL ≤ t0 , conditions (5.1) and (5.2) suggest that scheme C may still
have a comparative advantage over D. Indeed, as the following result shows, scheme
C is likely to be superior from the government’s point of view.
Proposition 5.2. Under imperfect auditing, the government still prefers scheme C
to scheme D, provided that K is not too large.
As we show in the proof of Proposition 5.2 in Appendix A, the set of feasible
tariffs under scheme C includes all tariffs implementable under scheme D. Moreover,
as in the case of perfect auditing, C does not cause any auditing cost. Thus, even
though C may no longer lead to the implementation of the efficient tariff scheme, it
still has the advantage of avoiding auditing cost.
6. Non-contractible Auditing
In the previous sections, we assumed that auditing probabilities are contractible. Contractibility requires that a third party is able to verify whether the
government complied with an ex-ante announced random auditing procedure. Clearly,
this is difficult to accomplish in practice. Sometimes it may even be difficult to assess
whether an audit has been conducted at all. We therefore now discuss the situation where auditing cannot be contracted upon. For simplicity, we return to the
assumption that auditing, if carried out, is perfect.
First, consider scheme C as defined in Section 4.2, under which auditing never
occurs in equilibrium. Nevertheless, for the mechanism to work, it is crucial that
the threat of audit be credible. That is, firms must believe that the authority will
spend resources to learn c2 whenever reports do not coincide. Since auditing is noncontractible, this will be the case only if an ex ante announced auditing procedure is
self-enforcing, i.e., it is ex post in the government’s best interest to stick to it. The
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problem is that, since auditing is costly, the government may be better off by just
implementing the tariff t̄ that is optimal if the government does not elicit further
information. This tariff maximizes αW (cH , t) + (1 − α)W (cL , t), and is thus
t̄ =

a − [αcH + (1 − α)cL ]
.
3

Proposition 6.1. Auditing under scheme C is self-enforcing provided that
α(1 − α)(cH − cL )2
> A.
18b

(6.1)

To see this, note that in case reports i = L and j = H arrive, the government
is strictly better off by conducting an audit if8
αW (cH , hLH ) + (1 − α)W (cL , lLH ) − A > αW (cH , t̄) + (1 − α)W (cL , t̄).
The left-hand side of this inequality is largest if hLH and lLH are just marginally
below or above t∗H and t∗L , respectively. Substituting hLH = t∗H and lLH = t∗L , the
inequality simplifies to (6.1).
The threat of audit is thus more likely to be credible if α is close to 0.5,
cH − cL is large, and auditing costs A are small. Then, uncertainty about the foreign
firm’s cost is high so that the government strongly benefits from finding out the
true cost parameter and tailoring the tariff to the actual situation. Thus, somewhat
paradoxically, the government is able to implement efficient tariffs without any audits
if the quality of ex ante information about c2 is poor.
The threat of audits being self-enforcing does not depend on the auditing
probability. To see this, assume that, in contrast to the previous considerations, the
government announces an auditing probability θLH < 1. In this case, if firms submit
differing reports, a random procedure determines whether an audit is to be conducted
or not. Whenever this procedure requires an audit to occur, the government has an
incentive to audit only if (6.1) is satisfied.
If (6.1) does not hold, firms anticipate that there will never be an audit.
Consequently, under every tariff scheme where tH 6= tLL , one firm always has an
incentive to lie about c2 . The government is therefore not able to elicit information
from firms when applying scheme C.
8Strict

inequality of payoffs avoids multiple equilibria.
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Alternatively, the government could employ scheme D as characterized in Section 3. However, under scheme D, credible commitment to auditing is even more
difficult than under C. In the latter procedure, auditing is supposed to occur only if
firms’ reports differ and the government is thus unable to gather any additional information from them. An audit then indeed improves the government’s information
and, consequently, may be credible. In contrast, under scheme D, the government
must audit with positive probability even if it is clear that, due to the incentive
compatibility of the mechanism, the report is truthful. Since there is no immediate
benefit from auditing, it is not self-enforcing.9 This result can be summarized in the
following proposition:
Proposition 6.2. Auditing under scheme D is not self-enforcing.
Thus, if condition (6.1) is not satisfied, the government just implements t̄ if the
domestic firm files a suit, without asking the foreign firm for a report. This approach
can be interpreted as sticking to a “facts available” policy. Blonigen (2006) shows
that this option is chosen increasingly often. Condition (6.1) suggests two possible
explanations for this fact: (i) Because the number of dumping suits has increased over
time, authorities may suffer from work overload so that A is high. As a consequence,
they cannot credibly commit to a thorough audit. This in turn implies that it is
not worthwhile to pay attention to firms’ reports. Anticipating that there will be no
serious audit, firms lie anyway.10 (ii) Over time, authorities may have become more
9Self-enforcement

could be achieved in a repeated game if the authority cares about its reputa-

tion in future dumping suits (possibly involving other firms if they can observe the government’s
behavior). If this is the case and the discounted expected benefit from sustaining a reputation for
conducting audits exceeds A, the threat of audit is credible. However, since the expected benefit
from conducting an audit equals the discounted welfare implemented in a one-shot game, scheme D
cannot have a comparative advantage over scheme C in a repeated interaction as long as it is not
superior in a one-shot game.
10This implies that, to implement efficient tariffs, the government may want to have an “oversized”
agency dealing with dumping suits. In equilibrium, the agency’s employees would be idle, but this
signals that there exist sufficient resources to conduct audits. Or, in other words, the opportunity
costs of an audit are very low.
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experienced, i.e., they have better estimates about foreign firms’ costs so that the
left-hand side of (6.1) decreases.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the domestic government’s antidumping duty
choice in an asymmetric information framework where the foreign firm’s cost is observed by the domestic firm, but not by the government. Truthful cost revelation can
be ensured by gathering additional information (auditing) conditional on firms’ cost
reports and threatening penalty duties in case untruthful reporting is detected.
The full-information (efficient) tariffs are implemented if the government also
collects information from the foreign firm in case the domestic firm reports low cost
(scheme C).

If the government never solicits information from the foreign firm

(scheme D), the efficient tariffs will not be implemented despite the fact that a
mechanism can be designed such that the domestic firm will always tell the truth
in equilibrium. If no audit occurs, this can be viewed as a “facts available” policy because no additional information is gathered after the domestic firm has filed a
dumping complaint. Such a scheme may be optimal if the welfare losses from implementing non-efficient tariffs and/or auditing costs are low or if the costs of obtaining
information from the foreign firm are high.
If the government cannot commit to auditing ex post, scheme D does not work
because it is not ex post optimal for the government to conduct an audit. In contrast,
auditing under scheme C may be self-enforcing, but if the auditing cost is too large
or ex-ante information about foreign cost is too precise, auditing is not contractible,
either. Then, the government will be better off by disregarding the firm reports and
only using ex ante available information, which constitutes another case of a “facts
available” policy.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Letting µ denote the Lagrange multiplier for (3.2), the
first-order condition for an interior solution with 0 < θL < 1 is
−(1 − α)A + µ[Π1 (cH , tL ) − Π1 (cH , 0)] = 0.
It follows that, if tL > 0 (which will be the case at the optimal solution) and 0 <
θL < 1, then µ 6= 0 and thus (3.2) must be binding. Concerning possible corner
solutions, note that θL = 1 can only be optimal if tH = 0. Then, (3.2) is also binding.
Furthermore, θL = 0 is feasible and thus optimal only if tH ≥ tL . If tH = tL , (3.2)
is again binding. A tariff schedule with tH > tL cannot be optimal. In this case,
we would have tH 6= t∗H , or tL 6= t∗L , or both, while (3.2) is not binding. Thus, the
government can increase its expected profit by marginally adjusting tH or tL , keeping
θH = 0. Consequently, (3.2) is always binding at the optimal solution yielding
θL (tH , tL ) =

Π1 (cH , tL ) − Π1 (cH , tH )
.
Π1 (cH , tL ) − Π1 (cH , 0)

(A.1)

Note that θL ∈ [0, 1] for tH ≥ 0, which will be the case at the optimal solution. Using
(A.1), we can substitute θL in the objective function to obtain
max{αW (cH , tH ) + (1 − α)[W (cL , tL ) − θL (tH , tL )A]}.
tL ,tH

(A.2)

The first-order conditions with respect to tH and tL then are11
α

a − cH − 3tH
∂θL
− (1 − α)
A = 0,
3b
∂tH
a − cL − 3tL ∂θL
A = 0.
−
3b
∂tL

From these conditions, since

∂θL
∂tH

< 0 and

∂θL
∂tL

(A.3)
(A.4)

> 0, it follows that t∗H ≤ tH and

tL ≤ t∗L (the inequalities are binding if A = 0). Finally, it remains to verify that this
solution also satisfies (3.1b). But, provided the antidumping authority sets fL ≤ tL ,
this follows immediately from the fact that tL ≥ tH .
11We

small.
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assume that the first-order conditions are also sufficient, which is the case if b is sufficiently
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Proof of Proposition 5.1. Under scheme D, the domestic firm’s incentive compatibility constraint for the case c2 = cH now is
Π1 (cH , tH ) ≥ (1 − τ θL )Π1 (cH , tL ) + τ θL Π1 (cH , fH ).

(A.5)

The government cannot do better than setting fH = 0. Then, due to the convexity
of Π1 (c2 , t) in t, for (A.5) to hold it is necessary that
tH ≥ (1 − τ θL )tL ,
which is equivalent to tL − tH ≤ τ θL tL . Applying θL ≤ 1, inequality (5.2) follows
immediately. Furthermore, it is easily verified that the first-order conditions characterizing the optimal tariffs, using the fact that θL is equal to the expression given in
(A.1) divided by τ , now are
α

a − cH − 3tH
∂θL
+ (1 − α)
A = 0,
3b
∂tH
a − cL − 3tL ∂θL
−
A = 0.
3b
∂tL

Implicit differentiation of these conditions yields that tH decreases in τ whereas tL
increases. To prove (5.1), we need to derive the incentive compatibility constraints
for scheme C. To do so, we first consider the second stage of the game, where the
foreign firm is asked for a report. If c2 = cL , truthful reporting requires that
Π2 (cL , tLL ) ≥ (1 − τ θLH )Π2 (cL , tLH ) + τ θLH Π2 (cL , lLH ).

(A.6)

If c2 = cH , the only way that the game could have progressed to the second stage
is that firm 1 must have reported c2 = cL , so that firm 2’s incentive compatibility
constraint is
(1 − τ θLH )Π2 (cH , tLH ) + τ θLH Π2 (cH , hLH ) ≥ Π2 (cH , tLL ).

(A.7)

In the first stage, given truthful reporting in stage two, the home firm’s incentive
compatibility constraints for c2 = cL and c2 = cH , respectively, are
Π1 (cL , tLL ) ≥ Π1 (cL , tH ),
Π1 (cH , tH ) ≥ (1 − τ θLH )Π1 (cH , tLH ) + τ θLH Π1 (cH , hLH ).

(A.8)
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To satisfy (A.6), (A.7), and (A.8), the government cannot do better than choosing
lLH such that Π2 (cL , lLH ) = 0 and hLH = 0. Then, by convexity of t 7→ Πi (c2 , t) for
each i, in order for (A.6) and (A.8) to be satisfied it is necessary that

tLL ≤ (1 − τ θLH )tLH + τ θLH t0 ,
tH ≥ (1 − τ θLH )tLH .

Combining these two conditions and then using that θLH ≤ 1, we obtain that tLL and
tH are implementable only if (5.1) holds.

¤

Proof of Proposition 5.2. Under scheme D, the firm’s incentive compatibility constraints now are

Π1 (cH , tH ) ≥ (1 − τ θL )Π1 (cH , tL ) + τ θL Π1 (cH , fH ),

(A.9a)

Π1 (cL , tL ) ≥ (1 − τ θH )Π1 (cL , tH ) + τ θH Π1 (cL , fL ).

(A.9b)

We now show that any combination of tariffs tH and tL with tH ≤ tL that is feasible
under scheme D is also implementable under scheme C. Consider the particular
tariffs tH = t̂H , tL = t̂L , and t̂H ≤ t̂L , and assume that these tariffs satisfy (A.9a) and
(A.9b) for some auditing probabilities θL and θH and fL = fH = 0. Then, it must
also hold that
Π1 (cH , t̂H ) ≥ (1 − τ )Π1 (cH , t̂L ) + τ Π1 (cH , 0).

(A.10)

Regarding scheme C, set θLH = 1, tH = t̂H , tLL = tLH = t̂L , hLH = 0, and lLH = t0 ,
such that Π2 (cL , lLH ) = 0. Then, it is easily verified that (A.6)–(A.8) are satisfied. In
particular, (A.8) follows from (A.10). Thus, by applying scheme C, the government
can implement at least the set of tariffs that is feasible under D. Moreover, to
implement these tariffs, it does not have to incur any auditing costs. Therefore, C is
still preferable provided that K is not too large.

¤
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Appendix B. Additional calculations
Concavity of (A.2). The partial derivatives of the government’s objective function,
denoted by Γ, are:
∂ 2Γ
α
∂ 2 θL
=
−
−
(1
−
α)
A,
∂t2H
b
∂t2H
·
¸
∂ 2Γ
1 ∂ 2 θL
= (1 − α) − − 2 A ,
∂t2L
b
∂tL
∂ 2Γ
∂ 2 θL
= −(1 − α)
A.
∂tL ∂tH
∂tL ∂tH
For concavity of (A.2), it must hold that
∂2Γ
∂ 2Γ
∂ 2Γ ∂ 2Γ
<
0,
<
0,
−
∂t2H
∂t2L
∂t2H ∂t2L

µ

∂ 2Γ
∂tL ∂tH

¶2
> 0.

First note that θL (tH , tL ) is independent of b since this parameter cancels out when
calculating the profit function quotient. Calculating the derivatives yields:
∂Π1 (cH ,tH )

∂θL
∂tH
=−
< 0,
∂tH
Π1 (cH , tL ) − Π1 (cH , 0)

(B.1)

∂ 2 Π1 (cH ,tH )

∂ 2 θL
∂t2H
=−
< 0,
2
∂tH
Π1 (cH , tL ) − Π1 (cH , 0)
∂Π1 (cH ,tL ) ∂Π1 (cH ,tH )

∂ 2 θL
∂tL
∂tH
=
> 0,
∂tL ∂tH
[Π1 (cH , tL ) − Π1 (cH , 0)]2
∂θL
=
∂tL

∂Π1 (cH ,tL )
[Π1 (cH , tH )
∂tL

− Π1 (cH , 0)]

(Π1 (cH , tL ) − Π1 (cH , 0))2

>0

(B.2)

2tH [2(a − 2c1 + cH ) + tH ][4(a − 2c1 + cH )2 + 6(a − 2c1 + cH )tL + 3t2L ]
∂ 2 θL
=
−
< 0.
∂t2L
t3L [2(a − 2c1 + cH ) + tL ]3
The last derivative is negative which follows from the fact that a − 2c1 + cH ≥ 0
since we assume that q1 (0) > 0 (see Section 2). Thus, (A.2) is concave in the relevant
range12 0 < t∗H ≤ tH ≤ tL ≤ t∗L for sufficiently small b, since the second derivatives of
θL are bounded over this range.
12By
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the first-order conditions (A.3) and (A.4), the candidate solution for a global maximum lies

within this range. Moreover, when deriving the optimal tariff combination, we could also restrict
attention to the range t∗H ≤ tH ≤ tL ≤ t∗L from the outset. On the one hand, for any given tL , (A.2)
increases in tH if tH < t∗H . The reason is that raising tH improves welfare while lowering the optimal
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Proof that tL − tH decreases in A. By the first-order conditions (A.3) and (A.4),

" # "
#
2
2
∂tH
∂θL
− αb − (1 − α) ∂∂tθ2L A −(1 − α) ∂t∂Hθ∂tLL A
(1
−
α)
∂tH
H

 ∂A =
.
2
2
∂tL
∂θL
− ∂t∂Hθ∂tLL A
− 1b − ∂∂tθ2L A
∂A
∂tL
L

Denoting the 2 × 2-matrix by H and applying Cramer’s rule yields


∂ 2 θL
∂θL
(1 − α) ∂tH −(1 − α) ∂tH ∂tL A

det 
∂θL
∂ 2 θL
1
−
−
A
2
∂tL
b
∂tL
∂tH
=
,
∂A
det H


2
∂θL
− αb − (1 − α) ∂∂tθ2L A (1 − α) ∂t
H
H
det 
∂ 2 θL
∂θL
A
−
∂tL
∂tH ∂tL
∂tL
=
.
∂A
det H
Since the government’s objective function is concave, it must hold that
1 ∂ 2 θL
α
∂ 2 θL
det H > 0, − − 2 A < 0, − − (1 − α) 2 A < 0.
b
∂tL
b
∂tH
Together with

∂θL
∂tH

< 0,

∂θL
∂tL

> 0, and
∂tH
>0
∂A

∂ 2 θL
∂tH ∂tL

> 0, compare (B.1) and (B.2), we get

and

∂tL
< 0.
∂A

Proof that tL − tH increases in α. From the above considerations,


a−cH −3tH
∂θL
∂ 2 θL
+ ∂tH A −(1 − α) ∂tH ∂tL A
3b

det 
∂ 2 θL
1
A
0
−
−
2
b
∂tL
∂tH
=
< 0,
∂α
det H


2
∂θL
A
− αb − (1 − α) ∂∂tθ2L A a−cH3b−3tH + ∂t
H

H
det 
∂ 2 θL
− ∂tH ∂tL A
0
∂tL
=
> 0.
∂α
det H
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